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A Means to an End: How the Expansion of 
The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 by the 
Supreme Court Created a Loophole for 
Corporations to Avoid Claims by 
Consumers and Workers Alike 
Brittany L. Pushkin 
Arbitration is rarely thought of outside the legal and business 
world by the everyday lay person. Whether we know it or not—all 
of us, in some capacity, have agreed to a mandatory arbitration 
clause. A contract for cellular service, an employer-employee 
arrangement, or an agreement to open a bank account are just a 
few common examples that lock not only clients, but also 
employees, in contracts that contain mandatory arbitration 
clauses. In 1925, the Federal Arbitration Act was imagined to 
propel the efficiency of justice. However, the Supreme Court has 
greatly expanded the scope of the Act; which, in turn, has twisted 
the original intent of the Federal Arbitration Act and created a 
loophole for corporations to avoid class action litigation all 
together without even looking toward the merits of each case. 
Allowing this kind of abuse only deprives consumers and 
employees of their Seventh Amendment right to trial as mandatory 
arbitration clauses only seem to become more commonplace. 
Originally, the Federal Arbitration Act was enacted to create 
another avenue to dispute resolution in order to speed up cases 
where both parties agreed to avoid trial. Now, arbitration is a 
wonderland for large companies where the world of justice is 
flipped on its head and rules of evidence are thrown out without 
any regard for the law. Even though arbitration is a private 
dispute resolution, this should not undermine basic due process 
measures. Simply because large corporations want to avoid the 
expenses of the trial courts and damages, this does not mean 
justice should be put on the wayside. Individuals may be left in a 
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worse position after arbitration— even if they come out on the 
winning side. 
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“Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own 
person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, 
but always at the same time as an end.”1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Seventh Amendment of the Bill of Rights guarantees, “[i]n suits 
at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty 
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”2 Despite this 
express right to trial, many individuals’ claims are now being pigeon-holed 
into private dispute resolution.3 Mandatory arbitration clauses have 
become an integral part of American life, for better or for worse. However, 
although originally thought to streamline the judicial process and save the 
individual’s hard-earned money on rising litigation costs, arbitration has 
become a death sentence for legal claims.4 Although the word arbitration 
is freely floated around, very few individuals understand what this process 
entails.5 Even more troubling, a vast majority of these individuals are 
likely subject to a mandatory arbitration clause.6 These clauses are 
commonly snuck into long employment or client contracts with 
companies. Although supporters of these arbitration clauses may argue 
that it is the fault of the signee for not reading the fine print—the blame 
must be shifted onto these large companies.7 
 
1 IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS, 87 (Mary Gregor 
et al. eds., 2nd ed. 2012). 
2 U.S. Const. amend. VII. 
3 See Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking 
the Deck of Justice, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-
stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html (“Over the last few years, it has become increasingly 
difficult to apply for a credit card, use a cellphone, get cable or Internet service, or shop 
online without agreeing to private arbitration. The same applies to getting a job, renting a 
car or placing a relative in a nursing home.”). 
4 See Congress Must Undo Damage of U.S. Supreme Court’s Latest Anti-Consumer 
Decision, PUBLIC CITIZEN (May 17, 2011), https://www.citizen.org/news/congress-must-
undo-damage-of-u-s-supreme-courts-latest-anti-consumer-decision/ (explaining that the 
Federal Arbitration Act was originally “a law whose goal was to help facilitate voluntary 
arbitration between businesses”). 
5 Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, A ‘Privatization of the 
Justice System’, THE NEW YORK TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-
the-justice-system.html?module=inline. 
6 Silver-Greenberg and Gebeloff, supra note 3. 
7 See Hearing on H.R. 4960 A Bill to Amend The Securities Exchange of 1934: 
Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance of the Committee 
on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives, 100th Cong. 424 (1988) (statement 
of William J. Fitzpatrick, Senior Vice President, General Counsel, and SIA). 
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While the arbitration procedure can be more efficient than the 
traditional rules of litigation, this in turn has a disparate effect on 
consumers, small business owners, and employees against the corporate 
goliath. These corporations understand that arbitration not only is far less 
expensive than traditional litigation, but it is tilted in favor of the big guy.8 
Large businesses even have the resources and connections to sway 
arbitrators’ opinions in their favor. 9  This is despite the fact that arbitration 
was originally designed to settle claims as discretionary and duly agreed 
upon by all involved parties.10 Thus, arbitration has become a pseudo-
courtroom that leaves information normally available to the public—in the 
shadows.11 These individuals have valid claims that require the attention 
and experience that a courtroom can provide in order to equitably decide 
the course of action. Further, it is the publicity of trials that can bring 
notoriety to claims and warnings of abuse. Yet, now “[t]housands of cases 
brought by single plaintiffs over fraud, wrongful death and rape are now 
being decided behind closed doors.”12 
According to the Economic Policy Institute, “by 2024, more than 80 
percent of private sector nonunion workers will be blocked from court by 
forced arbitration clauses with class- and collective-action waivers.”13 For 
many individuals, it is now or never. Yet, it is clear that in the past ten 
years, the Supreme Court has greatly perverted the original intent of the 
Federal Arbitration Act14 only to now read it based on a strict, textualist 
theory.15 The Federal Arbitration Act was never intended to be a malleable 
tool for large corporations to wield against the rest of the 99%.16 Here, it 
 
8 Silver-Greenberg and Gebeloff, supra note 3. 
9 Id. (“[T]he rules of arbitration largely favor companies, which can even steer cases to 
friendly arbitrators, interviews and records show.”). 
10 See Congress Must Undo Damage, supra note 4. 
11 See generally Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration 96 N.C. L. 
Rev. 679, 679-81 (2018) (explaining the secrecy that lies within arbitration as compared 
with the openness that accompanies public trials). 
12 Silver-Greenberg and Gebeloff, supra note 3. 
13 HAMAJI ET. AL., UNCHECKED CORPORATE POWER 1 (May 2019), 
https://www.epi.org/files/uploads/Unchecked-Corporate-Power-web.pdf. 
14 See generally Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court 
Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 99, 
99-100 (2006) (explaining the new scope and reach of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925). 
15 Id. at 157 (“Over the last twenty-five years, the Justices have shown an ability to 
misuse both legislative history and textualism to reach their desired result, rather than to 
interpret the statute that was enacted.”). 
16 See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh 
Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669, 729-30 (2001). 
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was the legislature who created this act, but the Court that destroyed it.17 
Now, it is time for the Legislature to act and salvage what is left of the 
Act. 
II. THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT OF 1925 
Nearly 100 years ago, arbitration was devised as a mechanism tailored 
to businessmen of similar resources that were in fairly simple dispute.18 
Currently, arbitration is defined as “a private process where disrupting 
parties agree that one or several individuals can make a decision about the 
dispute after receiving evidence and hearing arguments . . . After the 
hearing, the arbitrator issues an award.”19 This definition may seem 
straightforward; however, this was the original intent that the legislature 
had in mind when crafting the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925.20 
A. The Original Intent of The Federal Arbitration Act 
In the 1920’s, the Congress was cognizant of how troubling litigation 
was for the average business—it bred animosity and emptied pockets.21 
Thus, the Federal Arbitration Act sought to alleviate the burdens of the 
judicial process by allowing individuals who had contracted together to 
solve any issue in a less formal and expedited manner.22 Moreover, the 
 
17 See Congress Must Undo Damage, supra note 4 (“It is now clear that a five-justice 
majority on the court is committed to turning the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 . . . into 
a shield against corporate accountability.”). 
18 Garrett Epps, An Epic Supreme Court Decision on Employment, THE ATLANTIC, (May 
22, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/05/an-epic-supreme-court-decision-on-
employment/560963/ (stating that the Federal Arbitration Act was envisioned to 
“efficiently settle disputes among merchants—business interests with comparable 
bargaining power”). 
19 Arbitration, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, (date last accessed: January 5, 2020), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/dispute_resolution/resources/DisputeResolutionProc
esses/arbitration/. 
20 Moses, supra note 14, at 110-11 (explaining that the Federal Arbitration Act was 
intended as a procedural law which allowed a new form of private dispute resolution that 
was geared towards simple disputes). 
21 See generally id. at 103 (“[T]he [original New York State] statute [that served as a 
basis for the Federal Arbitration Act] was directed at three evils: (1) long delays caused by 
congested courts and excessive motion practice, (2) the expense of litigation, and (3) failure 
through litigation to reach a decision as just.”). 
22 Id. at 102 (“‘Arbitration saves time, saves trouble, saves money . . . .It preserves 
business friendships . . . It raises business standards. It maintains business honor, prevents 
unnecessary litigation, and eliminates the law’s delay by relieving our courts.’” (citing 
Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Hearing of S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before 
the J. Comm. Of Subcomms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 16 (1924) (statement of Julius 
Cohen))). 
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drafters believed arbitration allowed for equity, but also promoted unity in 
the business community even after a dispute.23 
As a guide, the legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act of 
1925 provides clear and vivid accounts of the original intent of Congress.24 
As one representative proclaimed, “‘[t]his bill simply provides for one 
thing, and that is to give an opportunity to enforce an agreement in 
commercial contracts and admiralty contracts—an agreement to arbitrate, 
when voluntarily placed in the document by the parties to it.’”25 This new 
law was designed to address disputes between arms-length, equally-able 
bargaining parties that had both mutually agreed to be in a transaction 
governed by an arbitration clause.26 The Federal Arbitration Act was 
originally not designed to be applicable to most employer-employee 
contracts.27 Further, the framers envisioned this bill  would provide a 
cheaper, more efficient way to deal with non-complex legal disputes.28 The 
Legislature recognized that more complicated claims were better off with 
the experience and procedural safeguards of the court system.29 
Lastly, one of the main goals of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 
was to allow businessmen to amicably reconcile even after dealing with 
any sort of legal dispute.30 Litigation can be a hostile process—as costs 
grow, so can contempt. Therefore, the legislature acknowledged a less 
formal arena would help to diminish any conflict between the parties 
during the lawsuit and after it. Nevertheless, this sort of camaraderie that 
was emphasized in the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 no longer remains. 
B. Supreme Discretion: How The Supreme Court Created A New 
Federal Arbitration Act 
Despite the basic framework and extensive legislative history of the 
Federal Arbitration Act, the Supreme Court, over the past thirty years, 
transformed this Act into an unrecognizable tool for the wealthy and 
 
23 Id. 
24 See generally id. 
25 Id. at 108 (citing 65 Cong. Rec. 1931 (1924) (emphasis added)). 
26 Epps, supra note 18. 
27 Moses, supra note 14, at 105-06. 
28 Id. at 111. 
29 See id. (“Arbitration was ‘not the proper method for deciding points of law of major 
importance of involving constitutional questions or policy in the application of statutes.’ 
These kinds of questions were not within the particular experience of the arbitrators and 
thus were ‘better left to the determination of skilled judges with a background of legal 
experience and established system of law.’” (citing Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, 
The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265, 281 (1926))). 
30 Id. at 102-03. 
148 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:142 
 
powerful.31 Originally, arbitration was reserved solely for businessmen in 
a transaction.32 Yet, today, arbitration is now enforceable in consumer and 
employee contracts.33 Further, this procedural, federal law has been 
transformed into a substantive law that is able to preempt state law all the 
while dealing with certain, consequential rights such as antitrust and 
antidiscrimination statutes.34 
The current paradigm began when the Supreme Court greatly 
increased the scope of this Act.35 Yet, as the Federal Arbitration Act’s 
breadth ballooned, the Court would then in turn read the Act’s plain 
language on its face. Strangely enough, the Supreme Court Justices have 
expanded this law liberally all the while interpreting it textually. Although 
those two words could not seem further apart, this is what is incredibly 
peculiar about this conundrum. Yet, if one takes a step back to look at the 
fuller picture, it is clear that this was by design.36 
Unbeknownst to the general public, legal masterminds slowly started 
to expand the reach of the Federal Arbitration Act in the previous 
decades.37 This sort of paradox was driven by large corporations seeking 
out one thing: a loophole. Now, consumers and employees alike have little 
to no recourse if bound by arbitration clauses. 
III. RISE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
The 1980’s may have marked a new era for the Federal Arbitration 
Act, yet it is the past ten years that has truly solidified the reach of the 
Act.38 In 2011, with AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, the Supreme 
Court took a very liberal approach when defining the parameters of the 
 
31 See id. at 157 (“All of the Justices at various points in time lost sight of the purpose 
and scope of the legislation or deferred to faulty precedent, creating a far different statute 
from the one enacted by Congress.”); Epps, supra note 18 (“[T]he Court’s conservatives 
have reinterpreted the [Federal Arbitration] Act to include what they call a ‘liberal federal 
policy favoring arbitration agreements.’”). 
32 See Epps, supra note 18. 
33 Id.; Moses, supra note 14, at 112. 
34 See Moses, supra note 14, at 112-13. 
35 See Epps, supra note 18 (“This is a judge-made policy invention, reflecting 
conservative justice’s empathy for corporations and large employers facing lawsuits by 
consumers and employees.”). 
36 See Moses, supra note 14, at 132 (citing Circuit City Shores Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 
105, 132 (2001)). 
37 See id. 
38 See Moses, supra note 14, at 156 (“Despite concerns expressed by members of the 
1925 Congress that arbitration not be imposed in a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ context, the 
Supreme Court since the 1980s has created a statute which permits businesses to do exactly 
that.”). 
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Federal Arbitration Act.39 Yet, it is the ruling in this case that got the ball 
rolling. In AT&T Mobility, the Court found it was permissible for contracts 
to contain class action waivers within mandatory arbitration clauses. In the 
seven years after AT&T Mobility, the Court allowed the Federal 
Arbitration Act to preempt state law, limit the Effective Vindication 
Doctrine, and take precedence over the National Labor Relations Act of 
1935.40 This precedent severely restricts the rights of consumers and 
employees alike, all the while, shielding major corporations from any sort 
of lawsuit by making the possibility of legal action neither pragmatic nor 
possible.41 
A.  AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion 
In 2002, a married couple, Vincent and Liza Concepcion, signed an 
agreement with AT&T Mobility, LLC for the corporation to provide 
cellphones and a network service in exchange for monthly payments.42 
Under the contract, AT&T agreed to supply at no cost the cellphones for 
the service provided to its customers.43 However, after the Concepcions 
were charged over $30 in sales tax on each phone, they filed a complaint 
alleging fraud and false advertising which was later combined in a class 
action suit as other customers faced the same situation.44 Because the sales 
tax was too low of an amount for many people to individually sue for, class 
action was appropriate. This sort of collective action allows for the risk to 
be worth the reward for all those wronged.45 
However, the original agreement signed between the Concepcions, as 
well as many others, and AT&T required mandatory arbitration for any 
claims against the company.46 Further, the contract speculated that any 
claim must also be brought individually.47 In other words, this agreement 
contained a class action waiver clause. 
Based on the original service agreement, AT&T filed a motion to 
compel arbitration.48 The Concepcions responded that the service contract 
 
39 AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 560 U.S. 1740, 1745 (2011). 
40 See generally Moses, supra note 14, at 112-13. 
41 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2313 (2013) (Kagan, J. 
dissenting) (describing the arbitration clause in American Express’ contract as “impos[ing] 
a variety of procedural bars that would make pursuit of an anti-trust claim a fool’s errand”). 
42 Concepcion, 560 U.S. at 1744. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 See Silver-Greenberg and Gebeloff, supra note 3 (“[C]lass-action lawsuits, 
realistically [are] the only tool citizens have to fight illegal or deceitful business 
practices.”). 
46 Concepcion, 560 U.S. at 1744. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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was unconscionable “and unlawfully exculpatory under California law 
because it disallowed class-wide procedures.”49 In response, the District 
Court denied AT&T’s motion, holding that the arbitration clause in the 
contract purposely disfavored class action litigants, thus the contract was 
unconscionable.50 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s ruling 
consistent with California law under Discover Bank v. Superior Court.51 
The appellate court found that the Federal Arbitration Act did not 
supersede California law because the unconscionability measure was in 
line with basic contract principle.52  However, upon appeal to the Supreme 
Court, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, reversed the Ninth Circuit 
Court and found that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted California’s 
state law.53 Justice Scalia noted that the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 
has a liberal interpretation and the Discover Rule and comparable “state-
law rules . . . stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s 
objectives.”54 Basing his rationale on the “text”55 of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, Justice Scalia stated that the “‘primary purpose’ of the FAA is to 
‘ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements are enforced according to 
their terms.’”56 Here, Scalia’s reasoning set the framework for arbitration 
cases to follow. Without any regard for the terms of the arbitration 
agreement, Scalia drove forward the reasoning that the Federal Arbitration 
Act was meant to enforce any and all arbitration agreements. In his 
counterargument to the dissent, Justice Scalia merely mustered up that 
although there may be unrelated, but noteworthy reasons to not allow the 
Federal Arbitration Act to preempt state law, this cannot happen as it is 
simply “inconsistent with the FAA.”57 This sort of posturing of the Federal 
Arbitration Act poses the question: How far will this go? 
After the widely criticized Concepcion decision, many scholars 
recognized the immediate damaging effect not only on the legal field, but 
on consumers.58 The Supreme Court opened the gates for little to no 
 
49 Id. at 1745. 
50 Id. 
51 Id.; see generally Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005) 
(“[T]he law in California is that class action waivers in consumer contracts of adhesion are 
unenforceable, whether the consumer is being asked to waive the right to class action 
litigation or the right to classwide arbitration.”). 
52 Concepcion, 560 U.S. at 1745 (citing Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC., 584 F.3d 849, 
857 (2009)). 
53 Id. at 1753. 
54 Id. at 1748. 
55 Id. (referring to Section 2, 3, and 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act). 
56 Id. (citing Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford 
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)). 
57 Id. at 1753. 
58 See generally Myriam Gilles, Individualized Injunctions and No-Modification Terms: 
Challenging “Anti-Reform” Provisions in Arbitration Clauses, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 469, 
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accountability for large corporations.59 Class action suits promote a large 
community of similarly situated consumers to have their day in court when 
their claims are too small to be brought individually. Without a class action 
option, there is far too much financial risk in going to court or arbitration 
individually.60 With this decision, companies are now able to “simply opt 
out of potential liability by incorporating class action waiver language in 
their standard form contracts with consumers . . . .”61 
B. American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant 
Only two years after the historic decision in AT&T Mobility LLC. v. 
Concepcion, the Supreme Court was faced with another class-action 
waiver suit: American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant. Writing 
once again for the majority, Justice Scalia reinforced the broad approach 
to interpreting the Federal Arbitration Act and rendered another 
consequential decision serving as another huge win for large corporations 
and monopolies. 
After being exposed to exorbitant fees, business owners filed an 
antitrust suit under the Sherman Act of 1890 against the infamous credit 
card company, American Express.62 Because these merchants accept 
various credit cards, including American Express, at their respective 
places of business, these owners are charged certain fees by those credit 
card companies.63 However, the businessmen alleged that “American 
Express used its monopoly power in the market for charge cards to force 
merchants to accept credit cards at rates approximately 30% higher than 
the fees for competing credit cards.”64   Yet, similar to Concepcion, a class 
action waiver in the arbitration clause of the merchant’s contract with 
American Express stood in the way of the plaintiffs’ claim.65 
 
470 (2015) (predicting the direct effects that class action waivers will have on consumers 
such as “small-value individual claims are unlikely to be arbitrated . . . [while] 
‘procedurally difficult’ claims . . . cannot realistically be brought by individuals in 
arbitration”). 
59 See id. (“[B]y merely adding an arbitration clause (containing a class action ban and 
an anti-reform provision) to their contracts, corporate entities have seemingly won the right 
to cheaply and easily insulate themselves against many forms of privately-enforced legal 
liability, and with this, the right to continue engaging in practices that cause widespread 
harm, unless and until detected by a public enforcer.”). 
60 See Silver-Greenberg and Gebeloff, supra note 3 (“[I]t is nearly impossible for one 
individual to take on a corporation with vast resources.”). 
61 Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. Chi. L. Rev. 623, 627 (2012). 
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After American Express filed a motion to compel arbitration, the 
District Court ruled in its favor under the Federal Arbitration Act.66 The 
District Court found no weight to the merchants’ response which relied on 
a report concluding that in order to successfully “prove the antitrust 
claims”67 it would cost “‘at least several hundred thousand dollars, and 
might exceed $1 million,’ while the maximum recovery for an individual 
plaintiff would be $12,850, or $38,549, when trebled.”68 On appeal, the 
Second Circuit reversed and found in favor of the merchants.69 The 
Appellate Court “held that because respondents [merchants] had 
established that ‘they would incur prohibitive costs if compelled to 
arbitrate under the class action waiver,’ the waiver was unenforceable, and 
the arbitration could not proceed.”70 
Eventually, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and later vacated and 
remanded the case in accordance with the Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal 
Feeds Int’l Corp. decision.71 On remand, the Second Circuit found in favor 
of the merchants on two separate occasions.72 For a second time, the Court 
granted certiorari. Upon review by the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, 
found that “the antitrust laws do not guarantee an affordable procedural 
path to the vindication of every claim.”73 Despite the findings that show 
the huge expense and little reward of individually going to arbitration, the 
majority failed to acknowledge the consequences of this decision. Justice 
Scalia even went as far as saying, “the fact that it [the claim] is not worth 
the expense involving in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute 
the elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”74 Even though no 
rational individual would choose to arbitrate when the costs would greatly 
exceed the reward, the Court did not find that fact to be a legitimate reason 
to invalidate these arbitration clauses. Thus, the design has once again 
succeeded as procedurally the claimants may have an avenue to which to 






70 Id. (citing In re American Express Merchants’ Litigation, 554 F.3d 300, 315-316 
(C.A.2 2009)). 
71 Id.; see generally Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animals Feeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 
1775 (holding “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration 
unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so”). 
72 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2308 (describing how the Second Circuit actually found 
in favor for the merchants on remand and once more during a third rehearing in light of the 
AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion decision). 
73 Id. at 2309. 
74 Id. at 2311. 
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decisions no longer represent a tendency to favor arbitration; this is about 
silencing claims. 
Underlying this momentous decision in Italian Colors, are the 
remnants of the Effective-Vindication Doctrine. The Effective Vindication 
Doctrine was “[c]onceived as a means of ensuring that arbitration is an 
effective mechanism for vindicating federal statutory rights, the doctrine 
has played an important role in promoting access to justice.”75 However, 
Italian Colors reflects a suppression of this doctrine as the majority 
“limited effective-vindication challenges to situations where an arbitration 
agreement precludes the assertion of certain statutory rights and cases 
where filing and administrative fees in arbitration ‘are so high as to make 
access to the forum impracticable.’”76 As Justice Kagan explains in the 
dissent, “Amex has insulated itself from antitrust liability—even if it has 
in fact violated the law. The monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to 
insist on a contract effectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse.”77 
C. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis 
Justice Gorsuch begins the Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis majority 
opinion by posing two questions: “[s]hould employees and employers be 
allowed to agree that any disputes between them will be resolved through 
one-on-one arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to bring 
their claims in class or collective actions, no matter what they agreed with 
their employers?”78 Justice Gorsuch goes on to proclaim, “[a]s a matter of 
policy these questions are surely debatable. But as a matter of law the 
answer is clear.”79 
In 2018, the case law was clear. However, the precedent was built 
upon a series of flawed interpretations of the Federal Arbitration Act of 
1925.80 Similar to Concepcion and Italian Colors, the plaintiffs in Epic 
 
75 Okezie Chukwumerije, The Evolution and Decline of the Effective-Vindication 
Doctrine in U.S. Arbitration Law, 14 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 375, 375 (2014); see also Am. 
Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2313 (Kagan, J. dissenting) (“[T]he effective-vindication rule—
[was created] to prevent arbitration clauses from choking off a plaintiff’s ability to enforce 
congressionally created rights. That doctrine bars applying such a clause when (but only 
when) it operates to confer immunity from potentially meritorious federal claims.”). 
76 Chukwumerije, supra note 75, at 377-78 (quoting Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2310-11 (2013)). 
77 Am. Express Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2313. 
78 Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018). 
79 Id. 
80 See generally David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 
IND. L.J. 239, 251 (2012) (“The story of FAA jurisprudence since 1983 has been one of 
justices unwittingly backing themselves into an untenable position and then failing to 
perceive even a need to find a way out.”); Maureen Weston, The Death of Class Action 
After Concepcion?, 60 KAN. L. REV. 767, 773 (2012) (characterizing the Supreme Court’s 
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Systems Corp. v. Lewis had agreed to arbitrate individually any claims 
against the company.81 However, the plaintiffs in the current case were not 
customers of this corporation. They were employees.82 
In 1935, the National Labor Relations Act was enacted in order to 
protect the interests of workers and their right to gather against abusive or 
harmful practices by employers.83 Despite Justice Gorsuch’s original 
framing of the question, the central issue at the core of this case was 
whether corporations can override the employee’s right to collective 
bargaining enumerated in the National Labor Relations Act simply by 
contracting out of it. Unfortunately, according to Epic Systems, companies 
now can.84 
1. A Fractured History Is The Leading Precedent 
A great deal of the majority opinion in Epic Systems resembles the 
arguments of Concepcion and Italian Colors.85 In Epic Systems, Justice 
Gorsuch begins the majority opinion by describing a distorted history of 
the Federal Arbitration Act.86 Similar to Justice Scalia’s background of the 
Federal Arbitration Act in Concepcion, the majority opinion focused 
narrowly on the utmost importance of enforcing arbitration agreements all 
the while describing the vast plane in which the Act covers.87 Here, the 
majority disingenuously emphasized that the framers and drafters of the 
Act intended for all arbitration agreements to be “valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable.”88 
Disguised as an effort to enforce the Federal Arbitration Act, the Court 
turned a blind eye to the National Labor Relations Act. Justice Gorsuch 
rationalized that indeed when one looks closer at Section 7 of the National 
Labor Relations Act, there is no conflict of laws between this act and the 
 
decisions as “an infatuation with arbitration” (citing Jeffrey Stempel, Tainted Love: An 
Increasingly Odd Arbitral Infatuation in Derogation of Sound and Consistent 
Jurisprudence, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 795 (2012))). 
81 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1621. 
82 Id. at 1619-20. 
83 National Labor Relations Act, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, (last accessed 
January 5, 2020), https://www.nlrb.gov/how-we-work/national-labor-relations-act. 
84 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1632 (reversing the lower court’s decision and holding 
that the arbitration agreements are in fact enforceable in this case). 
85 Compare with id. at 1621 with AT&T Mobility LLC. v. Concepcion, 560 U.S. 333 
1740, 1745 (2011) and Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308-09 
(2013). 
86 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1621. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2); but see infra Section II.A. (illustrating the original intent 
of the framers and drafters of the Federal Arbitration Act and the focus on voluntariness, 
similar situated business interests, and non-complex issues such as those that dealt with 
protected rights). 
2021] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 155 
 
Federal Arbitration Act.89 Here, the Court reasoned, Section 7 merely 
permits collective bargaining and does not explicitly discuss “class or 
collection action procedures.”90 However, the National Labor Relations 
Act was passed into law twenty-one years before Rule 23 of Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
governs modern class action suits.91 Thus, the Court would be mistaken to 
immediate write off the intent of the framers of the National Labor 
Relations Act by not including something that simply was not an issue at 
the time. Here, it is obvious that the collective bargaining would in fact 
include class or collection action procedures as this the main goal of the 
framers of the National Labor Relations Act: promote unity against a 
tyrannical system.92 
2. A Means To An End 
Epics Systems represents a culmination of a seven-year project: a 
means to an end. The combined result of AT&T Mobility, Italian Colors, 
and Epic Systems is the empowerment of large corporations over 
consumers, small business owners, and now employees. Because of these 
decisions, simply inserting a mandatory arbitration clause with a class 
action waiver will make the costs of litigation and the chance of an 
individual filing a claim nearly disappear.93 By overriding the National 
Labor Standards Act, there is little to no recourse for an employee when 
an employer violates basic rights.94 Celine McNicholas, the Director of 
Governmental Affairs at the Economic Policy Institute, acknowledges that 
Epic Systems represents a shift in society “‘which makes it nearly 
impossible for millions of workers to get justice when their employers 
 
89 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1619. 
90 Id. at 1624. 
91 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
92 Epic Systems, 138 S. Ct. at 1633-34 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (“Congress’ aim in . . . 
the NLRA to place employers and employees on a more equal footing . . . .[T]he NLRA 
operate[s] on a different premise, that employees must have the capacity to act collectively 
in order to match their employers’ clout in setting terms and conditions of employment.”); 
Epps, supra note 18 (“[A] judge could read the NLRA to bar employer-imposed contracts 
requiring individual arbitration . . . Under the NLRA, these clauses could be considered as 
unfairly restricting ‘other concerted activities for the purpose of . . . mutual aid or 
protection.’ That doesn’t do violence to the FAA; its text explicitly allows an exception 
when contracts violate ‘grounds as in exist in law.’”). 
93 Gilles, supra note 58, at 470. 
94 See Epps, supra note 18 (noting that “these clauses make it easier for employers to 
maintain unfair or even unlawful employment structures and salary systems”); see also 
One Year Since Epic Systems v. Lewis, Arbitration is on the Rise, ECONOMIC POLICY 
INSTITUTE (May 21, 2019), https://www.epi.org/press/one-year-since-epic-systems-v-
lewis-arbitration-is-on-the-rise/. 
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violate fundamental workplace protections’” 95 put into place by Congress. 
Even if arbitration is still a viable option, it is behind closed doors and 
there is no public accountability.96 Furthermore, because the cost usually 
greatly outweighs the incentive to arbitrate, arbitration is a losing battle 
for each individual.97 
As Justice Ginsburg reflects upon in her dissent in Epic Systems, 
“[f]orced to face their employers without company, employees ordinarily 
are no match for the enterprise that hires them.”98 As a foreseeable 
consequence of Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, corporations have begun to 
“dramatically increase their use of forced arbitration clauses. Soon, only a 
small minority of American workers will be able to sue [in court] their 
employers.”99 In essence, Epic Systems represents the final nail in the 
coffin for claims by employees and consumers alike. 
IV. THE FUTURE HARM OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION CLAUSES 
A. The Supreme Court Decisions Continue To Sabotage 
Arbitration 
Arbitration clauses may be on the rise, but the integrity of arbitration 
is in jeopardy.100 Although this may seem counterintuitive as an onslaught 
of arbitration clauses and class action waivers are being injected in nearly 
every consumer and employee contract, arbitration is only hurt by these 
decisions.101 The Court has focused on the fact that although arbitration 
may not be the preferred route of many plaintiffs, it is still an option that 
does not intrude upon the Effective Vindication of their claims.102 But in 
actuality, mandatory arbitration clauses have transformed arbitration into 
a “claim-suppressing arbitration . . . .designed and intended to suppress 
 
95 One Year Since Epic Systems, supra note 94. 
96 See Estlund, supra note 11, at 102 (“While it is important not to overstate the contrast 
between arbitration and litigation, there is no doubt that much more of the arbitral process 
is shielded from public view.”). 
97 See Silver-Greenberg and Gebeloff, supra note 3. 
98 Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1640 (2018). 
99 One Year Since Epic Systems, supra note 94. 
100 Adam Raviv, Too Darn Bad: How the Supreme Court’s Class Arbitration 
Jurisprudence Has Undermined Arbitration, 6 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 220, 221 (2014) 
(“[A]lthough the Court’s recent class arbitration decisions have nominally ‘favored’ 
arbitration by upholding particular arbitration provisions, in fact the rulings may ultimately 
undermine the use of arbitration as an efficient, flexible means of resolving disputes both 
in the U.S. and internationally.”). 
101 Id. 
102 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013) (describing 
that although the arbitration remedy is expensive, it still exists for the plaintiff). 
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claims, both in size and number.”103 By design, arbitration clauses have 
been carefully woven in between the lines of lengthy contracts. On the 
surface, it may seem that large corporations incorporate these clauses 
because arbitration has the tendency to favor the company over the 
individual in the proceedings—yet, it is the fact that these individuals 
would rather forego their claim entirely that makes arbitration such an 
enticing option for these companies.104 With each and every landmark 
decision by the Supreme Court, the rights of consumers and employees 
have been chipped away at. Yet, it truly was the class-wide waivers that 
had the most pernicious effect. 
B. Decline of Class Actions 
More than a decade in the making, the move to block class 
actions was engineered by a Wall Street-led coalition of 
credit card companies and retailers, according to 
interviews with coalition members and court records. 
Strategizing from law offices on Park Avenue and in 
Washington, members of the group came up with a plan 
to insulate themselves from the costly lawsuits. Their 
work culminated in two Supreme Court rulings, in 2011 
and 2013, that enshrined the use of class-action bans in 
contracts. The decisions drew little attention outside legal 
circles, even though they upended decades of 
jurisprudence put in place to protect consumers and 
employees.105 
The downfall of class action suits began long ago. However, it was 
Concepcion that began the paradigm shift that would soon follow in 2013 
and 2018. As David Schwartz recognized, “[a]bsent salvation from the 
political branches, the class action for consumer and employment claims 
is dead.”106 
Despite Justice’s Scalia’s reasoning in Italian Colors that there is still 
a remedy, albeit an expensive one, to these plaintiffs’ claims107, no 
reasonable individual would lose thousands upon thousands of dollars to 
go up against the corporation.108 This financial risk is “simply not feasible 
 
103 Schwartz, supra note 80, at 240. 
104 See Silver-Greenberg and Gebeloff, supra note 3. 
105 Id. 
106 Schwartz, supra note 80, at 266. 
107 See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2311 (2013). 
108 See Janet Cooper Alexander, An Introduction to Class Action Procedure in the United 
States, DUKE UNIV. SCH. L., 1, 1 
https://law.duke.edu/grouplit/papers/classactionalexander.pdf (“Use of the courts to assert 
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if brought individually.”109 Class actions suits are important in the context 
of holding the corporation publicly accountable for its violations. Further, 
“[i]ndividual claims are typically small – perhaps only a few dollars, or 
even less. But in the aggregate, these small individual harms may yield 
large illegal profits.”110 Thus, although it may seem pedantic to sue over 
such seemingly trivial amounts, these companies are the ones gaining so 
much from this exploitation. Similar to the tax charged on the telephones 
in Concepcion or credit card transaction fees in Italian Colors, the 
individual amount may not seem significant enough to litigate over. Yet, 
it is the initial abuse in the first place that is bothersome. By slowly 
gathering these seemingly minor profits, these companies are opening the 
door to more blatant abuse. 
As Concepcion, Italian Colors, and Epic Systems demonstrates, the 
Supreme Court has let the corporations define who can sue them, or if they 
can be sued at all. This loophole was created by design under the theory 
that by “increasing plaintiffs’ transaction costs, [these] defendants can 
induce them to accept lower settlements or even drop their claims 
altogether.”111 It is this type of practice that allows claims to be suppressed, 
rather than arbitrated. For example, an employee may see it more 
worthwhile to keep her job while enduring violations of certain protections 
rather than being further exploited in a closed-door hearing that would eat 
up her entire life savings. By keeping all claims in the hands of the 
individual rather than in a class-wide dispute, the corporations are 
cognizant of the implications of less employees seeing the cause of action 
through. The American truism, “together we stand, divided we fall,” has 
never been more ominous as it is in these precarious times. 
V. SOLUTION 
The Supreme Court’s propensity to alleviate the class action burden 
on large corporations has seemingly sealed the fate for anyone legally 
obliged to a contract with a mandatory arbitration clause and a class action 
waiver. For many, it may seem like all hope is lost. Nevertheless, there 
have been strides in the Federal Arbitration Act reform in light of these 
 
rights is practicable only if the potential benefits exceed the cost . . . Claims that are too 
small . . . will not be pursued. No matter what rights may be written in the substantive law, 
if there is no means by which those rights can be enforced the law might as well not exist, 
for it can be violated with impunity.”). 
109 Jean R. Sternlight and Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer 
Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 75, 85 (2004). 
110 Cooper Alexander, supra note 108, at 1. 
111 Id. at 86. 
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three catastrophic Supreme Court decisions.112 The Court has gone too far 
in its interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act to even attempt to 
backtrack now. Hence, the duty has been passed onto both Congress and 
the companies imposing these mandatory arbitration clauses. It is time for 
to change, whether it be a new bill signed into law or the end of contracts 
written with such clauses—no matter how lucrative it may be for the 
corporation to keep such stipulations in place. 
A. The Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act: A Step In The 
Right Direction 
Throughout the years, there has been numerous attempts to amend, 
update, or repeal the Federal Arbitration Act.113 The most recent endeavor 
to legislate arbitration clauses came in the form of House Resolution 1423, 
or better known as the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act (FAIR 
Act).114 “On September 20, 2019, the United States House of 
Representations passed the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act (the 
“FAIR Act”), H.R. 1423, a bill seeking to eliminate mandatory arbitration 
agreements and class action waivers in future employment, consumer, 
antitrust, or civil rights disputes.”115 The bill states: 
The purposes of this Act are to— 
(1) prohibit predispute arbitration agreements that force arbitration of 
future employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights disputes; and 
(2) prohibit agreements and practices that interfere with the right of 
individuals, workers, and small businesses to participate in a joint, class, 
or collective action related to an employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil 
rights dispute.116 
In response to the FAIR Act, the White House released a statement of 
administrative policy rebuking this latest action by the House.117 The 
White House claimed, “[t]hese blanket prohibitions will increase 
litigation, costs, and inefficiency, including by exposing the vast majority 
 
112 See Jean R. Sternlight, Introduction: Dreaming About Arbitration Reform, 8 NEV. L.J. 
1, 3-4 (2007), http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/facpub/282 (discussing various attempts to 
reform the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 in response to the Supreme Court’s decisions). 
113 See id. 
114 Murray B. Silverstein, Proposed Legislation to Invalidate Arbitration Agreements 
and Class Action Waivers Passes House—Now in Senate, GREENSPOON MARDER 




116 H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.congress.gov/116/bills/hr1423/BILLS-
116hr1423rfs.pdf. 
117 EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, ST. OF ADMIN. POL’Y, (2019), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/SAP_HR-1423.pdf. 
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of businesses to even more unnecessary litigation. As written, the FAIR 
Act disregards the benefits of resolving disputes through arbitration, 
including lower costs, faster resolution, and reduced burden on the 
judiciary.”118 Ironically enough, the White House concluded its statement 
proclaiming, “[b]y limiting contractual options, this bill would hurt 
businesses and the very consumers and employees its seeks to protect.”119 
Despite the White House’s argument that the FAIR Act will only 
result in a slew of litigation120, it failed to recognize all the suits already in 
the courts fighting against arbitration clauses themselves. Therein lies the 
hypocrisy in this entire façade that mandatory arbitration actually speeds 
up the judicial process.121 Furthermore, even if there is an arbitration case 
that may be a quicker resolution to a litigation proceeding this does not 
mean it is an equitable resolution.122 It is obvious that supporters of the 
current paradigm value time saved rather than justice prevailed. The White 
House’s position is the common argument in support of mandatory 
arbitration.123 However, it is this efficiency fallacy that continues to persist 
despite numerous examples of arbitration as an unjust system.124 
Moreover, the White House’s claim that a reform to the current system 
will only increase unnecessary litigation fails to give proper weight to the 
merits of each case that is strong-armed into arbitration. It is obvious that 
many individuals with a valid claim forgo arbitration due to the costs 





121 See David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1247, 1312 (2009) (“However, if one compares all case dispositions in the two forums-
including settlements, pretrial dismissals, and the like-the average time to disposition may 
well be shorter in litigation than arbitration.”). 
122 See id. at 1339-40 (explaining that although the court system may very well have full 
dockets, the arbitration system has shown time and time again to be “pro-[corporate] 
defendant”). 
123 See Using Arbitration to Resolve Legal Disputes, FINDLAW, 
https://adr.findlaw.com/arbitration/using-arbitration-to-resolve-legal-disputes.html (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2019) (“Arbitration is generally considered a more efficient process than 
litigation because it is quicker, less expensive, and provides greater flexibility of process 
and procedure.”). 
124 Schwartz, supra note 121, at 1340-41 (explaining that there is “no evidence that it 
[mandatory arbitration] is fair”). 
125 See Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory Arbitration, ECON. 
POLICY INST. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-of-
mandatory-arbitration-access-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60-million-
american-workers/ (“Research has found that employees are less likely to win arbitration 
cases and they recover lower damages in mandatory employment arbitration than in the 
courts.”). 
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protecting large companies, not the workers or consumers.126 By insulating 
these large companies from future lawsuits, the Court, the White House, 
and other mandatory arbitration supporters are only saving these 
corporations significant damages that they would otherwise be likely 
ordered to pay.127 It is not that these consumers or employees are wasting 
the corporations’ time with nuisance suits—it is the entire system that has 
silenced valid claims.128 
B. The Digital Influence 
Though large corporations seem to be the true winner out of this 
system, many companies are now removing pre-dispute arbitration clauses 
from its consumer and employee contracts. One of the largest supporters 
of the FAIR Act was Google.129 Google threw its support behind this bill 
in the House after “[m]ore than 20,000 Google employees and contractors 
in Google offices located in 50 cities worldwide walked out for real change 
at 11:10am local time protesting sexual harassment, misconduct, lack of 
transparency, and a workplace culture that doesn’t work for everyone.”130 
One of the demands was “[a]n end to Forced Arbitration in cases of 
harassment and discrimination for all current and future employees, along 
with a right for every Google worker to bring a co-worker, representative, 
or supporter of their choosing when meeting with HR, especially when 
filing a harassment claim.”131 Here it is obvious that Google recognized 
that mandatory arbitration clauses not only hurt its workers, but these 
clauses were hurting its own internal operations.132 
On the other hand, companies that have neglected to take 
accountability into its own hands have faced challenges in this 
increasingly digital world. After news broke that a prominent law firm 
 
126 See id. 
127 See id. 
128 See Silver-Greenberg and Corkery, supra note 5; see also Silver-Greenberg and 
Gebeloff, supra note 3 (describing how “[s]ome state judges have called the class-action 
bans a ‘get out of jail free’ card, because it is nearly impossible for one individual to take 
on a corporation with vast resources”). 
129 Colin Lecher, Google Organizers Join Lawmakers in Arbitration Fight, THE VERGE, 
(Feb. 28, 2019, 12:40 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/28/18244752/google-
organizers-fair-act-bill-forced-arbitration. 
130 Google Employees and Contractors Participate In Global “Walkout For Real 
Change,” MEDIUM, (Nov. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/@GoogleWalkout/google-
employees-and-contractors-participate-in-global-walkout-for-real-change-389c65517843. 
131 Id. 
132 See Lecher, supra note 129; see also Colin Lecher, Google Will End Forced 
Arbitration For Employees In All Disputes, (Feb. 21, 2019), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/21/18235205/google-forced-arbitration-employee-
disputes. 
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included a clause in its contract for summer associates which required 
arbitration for any claim including Title VII sexual harassment claims, 
there was immediate backlash.133 Shortly after an uproar on social media, 
the firm tweeted it would no longer include a pre-dispute arbitration clause 
in its contracts for summer associates nor any other employee.134 
Over a year later, another prestigious law firm was in the news over 
the controversial arbitration issue.135 Yet, this time, this firm was 
proactively removing mandatory arbitration clauses from its employer-
employee contracts.136 Taking cues from Google, the firm released the 
news in a statement that focused on the needs of the employees.137 In an 
era of increased public accountability, these businesses are quickly 
realizing that although money can be saved through arbitration and 
silencing claims, this, in turn, will only have a negative effect. Employees 
are the foundation of any good business. By taking advantage of 
employees in the form of arbitration clauses, these companies are quickly 
facing repercussions both within its own organization and through the 
web. Critics of mandatory arbitration clauses are taking to social media to 
publish which organizations still require its employees to sign this sort of 
clauses as a warning to applicants.138 Due to the media’s ever extending 
reach, large companies either must respond or face the press. Thus, the 
onus is on these companies as well as Congress to start making active 
changes not only to employment contracts, but also to company-client 
agreements. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Almost 100 years after the creation of the Federal Arbitration Act, the 
Supreme Court has completely transformed the Act from its humble 
beginnings. The Federal Arbitration Act merely sought to allow arbitration 
agreements to be enforceable as any other contract. This bill was intended 
to ease the judicial process for merchants of similar means to resolve any 
 
133 Staci Zaretsky, Biglaw Firm Tries To Force Summer Associates To Arbitrate Sexual 




135 Kathryn Rubino, Another Elite Law Firm Kicks Mandatory Arbitration To The Curb, 
Above the Law, (Sept. 20, 2019), https://abovethelaw.com/2019/09/another-elite-law-
firm-kicks-mandatory-arbitration-to-the-curb/?rf=1. 
136 Id. 
137 See id. 
138 See generally Fighting For All To Be Free From Coercive Contacts, PEOPLE’S PARITY 
PROJECT, https://www.peoplesparity.org/coercivecontracts/ (demonstrating the amount of 
law firms that still require mandatory arbitration clauses in employee-employer contracts). 
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dispute quickly and effectively. Instead of waiting around for the clogged 
courts to intervene, these businessmen wanted a simpler dispute 
resolution. However, the Federal Arbitration Act has been manipulated in 
order to essentially phase out class action lawsuits and silence claims.139 
Although the Court seems to prefer arbitration, it is actually making 
arbitration in these suits meaningless. 
In order to combat the Supreme Court’s abusive misinterpretation of 
the Federal Arbitration Act, both Congress and corporations alike need to 
act. First, Congress should pass either the FAIR Act or a similar bill that 
either amends or replaces the Federal Arbitration Act. This piece of 
legislation should clearly outline in its text the original intentions of the 
drafters and framers of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925. For example, 
the new legislation should include a requirement for mutual consent and 
voluntariness. Further, corporations must have more accountability. As 
employees, consumers, and critics take a stand against these companies 
there will far more pressure on these institutions to act in the best interests 
of its signee. However, as each day passes by, another claim is silenced. 
By forcing arbitration, the consumer or employee may opt to not follow 




139 See Congress Must Undo Damage, supra note 4 (“It is now clear that a five-justice 
majority on the [C]ourt is committed to turning the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 – a law 
whose goal was to help facilitate voluntary arbitration between businesses – into a shield 
against corporate accountability.”). 
